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Children's education is vital to the longevity of a nation. Of equal importance is how a
nation provides educational resources to its disabled citizens. Currently, almost six million of our
nation's publicly-enrolled schoolchildren have a recognized disability under federal law. Each of
these students have an individualized education program (IEP) to help teachers and school
administrators provide them with a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE).
While there is great support to help disabled students learn alongside their peers, a lack of
resources often leaves these students without the necessary tools to be successful in the classroom.
When this happens, parents may resort to suing the school district for not furnishing an IEP that
provides their child with a FAPE. The courts will look to see if the school followed the procedure
laid out in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as well as try to determine if
the IEP has provided the child with an educational benefit.
This article will give a detailed background of the legislative and judicial history of special
education. In addition, a detailed explanation of the circuit split that was before the Supreme Court
during the October 2016 term will be examined. Currently, lower courts differ as to what level of
educational benefit an IEP must provide a disabled student to comply with the IDEA. Historically,
the lower courts have used four different ways to describe how much of an educational benefit
must be provided: (1) some; (2) meaningful; (3) more than de minimus; and (4) courts that use
some and meaningful interchangeably.
In the spring of 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on how much of an
educational benefit a child must receive under the IDEA. The Court essentially reaffirmed their
previous ruling and held that the benefit must be more than de minimus. Unfortunately, this did
little in the way of creating a clear standard, leaving the lower courts to continue applying different
standards. Thus, the level of educational benefit a disabled child receives depends entirely on
which circuit court has jurisdiction over the child's school.
This problem is simply not one that can be solved in the court system. Rather, it is the
legislative branch that must provide a solution. Specifically, the problem is due to a lack of
funding. While this paper will offer possible solutions for the courts as they wait for Congress to
act, Congressional action is ultimately needed to solve the disparity in the level of educational
benefits afforded to disabled children across this nation.

* Kelsey Manweiler, University of Idaho College of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2018. I would like to thank my
grandmother, mother, and sister for showing me the importance in advocating for better education standards for
children; Brianna Espeland for adding a personal element to my understanding of special needs education; and Sinan
Nadarevic for his continuous support throughout this article's development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"If a child can't learn the way we teach, maybe we should teach the way they learn."
-Ignacio Estrada
Ella,1 a sixth grader, began middle school with an individualized education program (IEP)
for modifications to be made to her exams, but not the material taught to her. A few months into
her sixth-grade year, her mother discovered she was failing her classes due to missing assignments.
Ella's mother called a meeting with her daughter's teacher and school administrators. Her mother
was upset that her assignments were not being modified. The administration produced the IEP and
noted that Ella's mother had previously agreed to modifications being made to her daughter's tests,
but not to the daily assignments and lesson plans. Further, the teacher explained that this may not
be a modification problem. Rather, most sixth graders in middle school struggle in the first months
with having several classes and homework. Thus, keeping organized is a challenge, unlike in
elementary school, where the students have only a single teacher and little to no homework. Ella's
teacher went on to discuss what she is doing with all of her classes to help the sixth graders adjust
to this new environment. Upon discovering that the IEP did not do what her mother wanted for
Ella, Ella's mother became very upset and threatened to sue the school if they did not start
modifying her daughter's lesson plans in addition to her exams. To avoid a lawsuit, the
administration then told the teacher to modify all of her lesson plans when it came to this particular
student. Consequently, the teacher would now have to simultaneously teach two lesson plans: one
for Ella and one for the rest of her class. Ironically, the school administrators found that this
particular teacher was one of only two teachers at the school that modified lesson plans according
to the IEPs. The rest of the teachers merely inflated grades after the fact as an accommodation.
Based on legal precedent, was it proper for the school administration to require the teacher
to make additional modifications for Ella, despite what her current IEP mandated? According to
the current circuit split and recent Supreme Court decision, it is unclear how the school should
have instructed the teacher to respond. This paper will illustrate that the "educational benefit"
standard established in Board of Education v. Rowley 2 fails to address the problems facing
implementation of effective IEPs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 3
This paper compares accommodations for disabled students to that of workplace accommodations
made under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 4 and discusses how Congress should
remedy the current problem. The goal of this paper is to show that the problems facing compliance
with the IDEA can and should be solved through the legislative process and not through the judicial
process.
"Education is.. .one of the [most] contested areas in our society," 5 and special education
receives no additional support from our nation. In Part I, a hypothetical scenario is introduced to
' Name has been changed to protect the student's identity. Parts of this story have also been fabricated to develop a
hypothetical example.
2 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07
(1982).
3 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (2012), amended by Every Student
Succeeds Act, 114 Pub. L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
4 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, Pub. L. 101-336 (2012).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Endrew F. ex. rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329
(1 0th Cir. 2015), sub nom. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 29, No. 15-827 (argued Jan. 11,
2017) (quoting Mr. Katyal for the respondents) [hereinafter Transcript].
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show the reader how the current circuit split has caused problems at the IEP implementation stage.
Part II of this paper will give an overview of the types of disabilities that are covered under the
IDEA as well as the legislative and judicial history of the IDEA. Part III of this paper will discuss
the circuit split and the recent Supreme Court decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School
District.6 Then, reasons why solving the circuit split through the judicial process does not solve
the application problem will be addressed in Part IV. Finally, Part V will discuss possible solutions
for solving this problem, and Part VI will conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that there is no
Constitutional right to education. 7 While Rodriguez was a case about the state's use of property
tax to fund public schools, it is one of the seminal cases cited as the reason there is no fundamental
right to a public education. Interestingly, just a year prior to Rodriguez, the Court recognized in
Wisconsin v. Yoder that states have a legitimate interest in the education of their children. 8 Thus,
any right to education would come from legislatures, and the responsibility of educating our youth
rested in the states' hands.9 Education tailored to the individual needs of the child was traditionally
only for the upper echelons of society. 10 It was not until the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s
that Americans started to push for education for all students." In Brown v. Board of Education,
Chief Justice Warren said, "[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." 12 Finally, we had a nation that cared about
the education of our society, at least in the abstract.
A. Disabilities and Special Education
As of 2017, there were over six million students with disabilities recognized under the
IDEA. 13 The classification of "individuals with disabilities" is an umbrella phrase encompassing
disabilities that range from severe physical impairments to behavioral and developmental
See generally Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988.
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that "[p]ublic education is not a 'right'
granted to individuals by the Constitution").
Margaret Condit, Remember the IDEA: A Callfor Courts to Apply a PiecemealApproach to TransitionLitigation,
38 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 6, 13 (2016) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); see also Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). While invalidating an anti-evolution teaching statute on First Amendment grounds,
the Court notes that "by and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities." Id.
9 Condit, supra note 8, at 13; see generally U.S. Const. amend. X (granting states sovereign powers in certain areas).
10 See Dep't of Educ., From There to Here: The Road to Reform of American High Schools at 1,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/hsinit/papers/history.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2017) ("Until the 20th
century, secondary education was a small-scale experience, largely reserved for the privileged, rather than the nearly
universal democratic institution of today"); see also generally American Public Education: An Origin Story, EDUC.
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.educationnews.org/education-policy-and-politics/american-public-education-anorigin-story.
" Condit, supra note 8, at 14-15.
12 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
13
Idaho
State
Dep't
of
Educ.,
Identification
of
Children with
Disabilities (2017),
http://www.sde.idaho.gov/sped/public-reporting/files/state-determination/StateStateid-datadisplay-2017bState-DataDisplay.pdf.
6

7 San
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afflictions. 14 Under the IDEA, recognized disabilities include: intellectual impairment; learning
disability; physical, cognitive, or emotional developmental delays; physical disabilities (blindness,
deafness, etc.); "serious emotional disturbance;" disabilities falling within the autism spectrum;
and other health impairments.1 5 Educators use instruction and intervention methods "to meet the
individual needs of each child with a disability," 16 also known as special education. 17 Additionally,
educators and parents create an individualized education program, also known as an IEP. An IEP
is a "written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in
accordance with [parental consent]."1 8 IEPs are creatures of statutory instruction, created in 1975
by Congress. 19 Courts analyze the school's use of the IEP's process to create and implement an
IEP, as well as the results achieved, to determine if a child with a disability has been provided a
free appropriate public education (FAPE) in compliance with the IDEA.2 0
B. Legislative History
In the United States, disabled students have historically been denied access to public
education. 2 1 In the mid-twentieth century, the federal government partnered with various family
organizations to develop education "practices for children with disabilities and their families."22
This effort paved the way for special education programs at the state and local levels. 23
Unfortunately, the 1960's brought only miniscule changes to special education. 24 It was far more
common for individuals with disabilities to be placed in institutions or asylums during this time. 25
Unfortunately, these institutions provided no educational or rehabilitative services. 26 Only the
basic needs of food and shelter were provided. 2 7 Additionally, public schools only educated one
See supra Part II.A.
§ 1401(3)(a)-(b) (2012); see also Christy Marlett, The Effects of the IDEA Reauthorizationof 2004 and
the No Child Left Behind Act on Familieswith Autistic Children:Allocation of Burden of Proof Recovery of Witness
Fees, andAttainment ofProven EducationalMethodsforAutism, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 53, 53 (2008) (describing
the autism spectrum to include, "autistic disorder..., pervasive development disorder... [A]sperger's syndrome, Rett's
syndrome, and childhood disintegrative disorder"); see generally Andrew M.I. Lee, The 13 Conditions Covered Under
IDEA, UNDERSTOOD (2017), https://www.understood.org/en/school-learning/special-services/special-educationbasics/conditions-covered-under-idea.
16 Off. of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Thirty-five Years of Progressin Educating Children
with Disabilities through IDEA at 1 (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/history/idea-35history.pdf.
17 Id.
18 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2012).
19 Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 94 Pub. L. 142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (definition of an IEP, sec.
4, (18)).
20 See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.
21 Megan McGovern, Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promises of IDEA, 21 WIDENER L. REv. 117, 118
(2015); see also Off. of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, supra note 16, at 3.
22 Off. of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, supra note 16, at 4.
14

15 20 U.S.C.

23 Id.

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966) (amendment
to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 which established a federal grant to help states provide
education to disabled children).
25 Off. of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that state institutions in 1967 were home to
nearly 200,000 individuals with disabilities).
24

26 Id.
27 Id.
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in five students with disabilities. 28 By the mid-seventies, many states had laws excluding children
with disabilities from receiving education alongside their non-disabled peers. 29 Some children
were undiagnosed, which prevented them from receiving the services they needed to be successful
in school. 30 Moreover, the lack of resources available within the public schools forced parents of
children with disabilities to seek educational services outside of the public system. 3 1
This changed in 1975, when Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (EHA). 32 This Act required, "that all children [ages three to twenty-one] with disabilities have
available to them ... a free appropriate public education" by establishing procedures to protect the
rights of children with disabilities and to assist states and localities in providing services for these
children. 33 The law aimed to make four improvements: (1) properly identifying children with
disabilities, (2) improving how the success of these efforts is measured, (3) managing due process
protections for claims made by families with children with disabilities, and (4)authorizing
additional federal funds to provide states with needed resources for compliance. 34 This landmark
legislation helped support the education of over one million children with disabilities who had
previously been excluded, in part or in whole, from receiving an appropriate public education. 35
Sue's story is a great illustration of the positive impact this legislation has had on the lives
of children with disabilities. 36 She was born in 1950 with no sight as well as with cognitive
disabilities. 37 By the time the EHA was passed in 1975, Sue was twenty-five years old.3 8 This
legislation enabled Sue to attend school for the first time. 39 After just one year of receiving
educational services through public school, Sue learned how to eat with utensils, walk with a cane,
and carry on social conversations. 40 The public education she received through EHA allowed her
to live independently as an adult. 4 1
Since the EHA's enactment forty-one years ago, the evolution of special needs education
has been reflected in its various amendments. 42 The amendments of 1986 mandated that state
services be provided for children with disabilities from birth, whereas previously it had been from
three years to age twenty-one. 43 Various amendments passed between 1983 and 1997 focused on
high school to adult living transitional services." These amendments required that every IEP

28

Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(b) (2012).
30 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(c).
31 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(d).
32 EHA, supra note
19.
33 Office of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, supra note 16, at 5 (quoting EHA).
34 Office of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, supra note 16, at 5 (discussing the changes P.L. 94-142 made to the
status quo).
35 Id. at 5-6.
36
Id. at 3.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Office of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, supra note 16, at 3.
41 Id.
42 See generally Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, 99 Pub. L. 457, 100
Stat. 1145 (1986).
43 Office of Special Educ. & Rehab Services, supra note 16, at 6 (citing the EHA Amendments of 1986, 99 Pub. L.
457, 100 Stat. 1145 (1986)).
44 Id. at 6 (citing EHA Amendments of 1983, 98 Pub. L. 199, 97 Stat. 1357 (1983); EHA Amendments of 1990, 101
Pub. L. 476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990); IDEA Improvement Act of 1997, 105 Pub. L. 17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997)).
29
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include post-school objectives and procedures for finding employment and living. 45 In
accommodating these services, the IEP names specific individuals to help with the transition to
adulthood and also connects the child with the state agencies and community services available to
the child as an adult. 46 The 1990 amendments also renamed the EHA, changing it to the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). 4 7
The IDEA was reauthorized in 2004 as the Individuals with Disabilities in Education
Improvement Act (IDEIA).4 8 This reauthorization was meant to align the goals of the IDEA with
the goals of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). 49 The goal of NCLB was to measure student
achievement through standardized assessments.5 0 Through NCLB, Congress mandated that
schools set educational goals for students based on testing results.5 1 If students did not annually
improve on standardized tests, the state lost federal funding for education. 52 In order to align the
goals of the IDEA and NCLB, Congress required that children with disabilities be included in the
statewide NCLB assessments, and that performance goals be altered under the IDEA to mimic the
goals under NCLB for all students be implemented.5 3 Because of this goal alignment, schools
across the nation feared losing federal funds if they did not meet the new standards. 54 The schools'
response was to "dumb down" their performance goals so they would appear to be making
progress.5 5 This decrease in the performance goals ran counter to the IDEA's objective of having
high expectations for children with disabilities. 56 Additionally, the move to standardized testing
ran counter to the goal of an IEP being an individualized program catered to the students' unique
needs.

57

Thirteen years later, Congress dealt a swift blow to NCLB when it passed the Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA), which reauthorized the fifty-year-old Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (ESEA).ss The ESSA represents a move away from heavily regulated federal education policy
towards a more flexible, federally funded, but state controlled, education initiatives. 59 Schools still
have to report to the federal government through accountability plans, 60 but the ESSA allows states
more flexibility in how they implement their accountability systems, and moves away from the
federal mandate of tying teacher evaluations to test scores. 6 1 Waivers of compliance with the
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 6 (citing EHA Amendments of 1983, 98 Pub. L. 199, 97 Stat. 1357 (1983); EHA Amendments of 1990, 101
Pub. L. 476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990); IDEA Improvement Act of 1997, 105 Pub. L. 17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
48 See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 108 Pub. L. 446, 118 Stat. 2647
(2004) (from here on, the author will refer to the Act that currently governs special education as the IDEA instead of
the IDEIA).
49 Marlett, supra note 15, at 65.
50
Id. at 63.
51

Id.

52 Id.
53 Id.
54

at 65.

Id. at 63.

5 Marlett, supra note 15, at 63.
56 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A) (2012).
57 Marlett, supra note 15, at 64.
5 U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), https://www.ed.gov/essa (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
59 Alyson Klein, The Every Student Succeeds Act: An ESSA Overview, EDUC. WEEK, (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/every-student-succeeds-act/.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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requirements of NCLB were void as of August 1, 2016, and the new ESSA accountability plans
had to be in full effect by the 2017-2018 academic year. 62 While these changes have been praised
on both sides of the political aisle, at first glance, ESSA has not made any noticeable improvements
for students with disabilities. 63 This is yet another example where the legislative branch had the
opportunity to clarify the IDEA, but did nothing.
Today, the IDEA is a federal spending program designed to assist school districts in
providing a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to children with disabilities."4 Under the
IDEA, a FAPE is defined as:
special education and related services that (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program . . 65
Unfortunately, the IDEA is plagued with ambiguities and a lack of Congressional oversight.
leads parents, as well as school districts, "to look to the courts for guidance." 67

66

This

C. Supreme Court Precedent
In addition to Congressional efforts, in 1982 the Supreme Court established the current
standard used to determine whether a school has complied with the IDEA in furnishing an IEP that
provides a free appropriate public education (FAPE).6 8 When faced with a claim that a FAPE has
not been provided under the IDEA, the court will ask: (1) whether the school district complies with
the mandated procedures in the IDEA when implementing an IEP; and (2) whether the IEP allows
the child to receive an educational benefit.. 69
In Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, the Court
held that the IDEA guarantees a "basic floor of opportunity," specifically designed to meet the
child's unique needs, supported by services that will permit him [or her] to benefit from the
instruction. 70 This case involved a deaf student who was denied a sign language interpreter in her
first grade class because it was determined that she was so adept at reading lips that she did not
need an interpreter. 7 1 Her parents disagreed with the school's decision and sued the school
district. 72 The district court found that she was not receiving a FAPE under what would become
Id.
Id.
64 Sarah Prager, An "IDEA" to Consider: Adopting a Uniform Test to Evaluate Compliance with the IDEA's
Least
Restrictive Environment Mandate, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 653, 654 (2015) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1401 (2012)).
65 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
62
63

66 Mark F. Kowal, Current Issues in Public Policy: A Call to the Courts to Narrow the Scope of the Definition of

Learning Disability Within the Americans with Disabilitiesin EducationAct, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 819, 819
(2009).
67 Id.
68 Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, at 206-07.
69 Id. at 206-08.
70
Id. at 201.
71 Id. at 184-85.
72 Id. at 185.
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titled the IDEA, because she understood significantly less than her non-deaf peers and, therefore,
she was "not learning as much or performing as well academically, as she would without her
[disability]."
The Supreme Court granted review to answer the statutory interpretation question of what
Congress meant by the requirement of a "free appropriate public education." 74 To answer this
question, the Court created a two-prong test. 75 The first prong is a procedural one, asking: "has the
state complied with the procedures set out in the Act?" 76 The second prong is substantive, asking:
"is the IEP . . . reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?" 77 The
first prong is a threshold element. If there is a procedural violation, the court will not consider the
substantive prong. Unfortunately, due to disagreement in the lower courts on how much benefit an
IEP must provide, it is the substantive prong that has created the circuit split. 78
While the Court recognized that Congress did not offer much assistance in defining what
was "appropriate," Congress provided a definition for the phrase "free appropriate public
education." 79 The Court noted that FAPE was defined as:
special education and related services which (1) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (2) meet the
standards of the State educational agency; (3) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (4)
are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required
under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.8 0
Ironically, the definition uses the term "appropriate" to define a "free appropriate public
education." Due to this ambiguity, the Court looked at Congressional records to determine the
intent of Congress. 81
The Court summarized the extensive history of education for children with disabilities that
led to the Act. 82 It interpreted the legislative history to show that the intent of Congress, through
this Act, was to provide access for children with handicaps to public education, not to guarantee
any substantive educational outcome. 83 The Court further noted that both the Senate and House
Reports on the Act made clear that an "appropriate education is provided when personalized
educational services are provided." 84 The reports are silent, however, as to any required outcomes
Id. at 185-86.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.
75 See id. at 458 U.S. at 206-07.
76 Id. at 207 (referring to the IDEA).
77 Id. at 208.
78 See infra Part III.
79 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187.
so Id. at 188 (quoting the definition of FAPE as defined through 94 Pub. L. 142).
s1 Id.
82 Id. at 191 (referencing 121 Cong. Rec. 19486 and 121 Cong. Rec. 19494, remarks by Sen. Williams
and Sen. Javits
respectively).
83
Id. at 192 (quoting S. Rep., No. 94-168 at 11, (1975) stating that the Act did not "guarantee to produce any particular
outcome"). See also id. at 201 ("[the] 'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized
instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped
child.").
84
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197.
73
74
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of these personalized educational services. 85 In addition, the Court also rejected the argument that
the Act required these individualized services to maximize the child's potential.8 6 Additionally, if
there were insufficient funds to provide for the services needed by the child with a disability, then
the available funds should have been apportioned so that no child's right to a FAPE was
disproportionately infringed upon. 87 This further illustrates the Court's belief that the Act was
about access to public education and not educational results.
The Rowley Court, however, believed that it would be pointless for Congress to appropriate
money for access to public education if a child received no benefit from that education.8 8 The
Court held that the Act was a combination of access to individualized instructions and services
that provide an educational benefit. 89 The problem lies in determining when enough educational
benefits had been provided to satisfy the Act's requirements. 90 Thus, the Rowley Court developed
the two-prong test mentioned previously to help answer this question. 9 1
In developing the two-prong test, the Court makes clear that it is not attempting "to
establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all
children covered by the Act." 92 Instead, the Court confined its test to situations similar to the
specific facts of this case: a student with disabilities who was receiving "substantial
specialized... services," and performing above grade average.93 This test was not meant for
students that were able to receive services that allowed them to meet the "mainstreaming
preference of the Act," i.e. allowed them to be educated in classrooms with children who did not
have a disability. Incidentally, this test would subsequently be applied by circuit courts to all claims
of violations of the IDEA for years to come. This led to a circuit split and the recent Supreme
Court case, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School.94

III.

CIRCUIT SPLIT

The circuit split involves the interpretation of how much of an educational benefit is
required under the IDEA. Some circuits have held that only "some educational benefit" is
required, 95 while other circuits require a "meaningful educational benefit." 96 The most problematic
language in Rowley combines both standards, noting, "[the] 'basicfloor of opportunity' provided
by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educationalbenefit to the [disabled] child." 9 7

1 See generally S. Rep., No. 94-168 (1975); see also H.R. Rep., No. 94-332 (1975).
86
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198.
87 Id. at 199 (citing Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.C. 1972)).
1 Id. at 201-02.
89
Id. at 200-01.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 206-07.

92 Id. at 202.
93 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.
94 See generally Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1338.
95 See id.; see also Cerra v. Pawling, 427 F.3d 186, 195 (2d. Cir. 2005).
96 See Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F. 3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004).
97 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
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A. Some Educational Benefit
Courts in the "some educational benefit" school of thought use language from Rowley that
states, "education to which access is provided [must] be sufficient to confer some educational
benefit." 9 8 The Second Circuit has held that a school district must only provide an IEP that is
"likely to produce progress, not regression," and "afford the student with an opportunity greater
than mere 'trivial advancement."' 99 Taking language from Rowley, the Ninth Circuit held that
Congress did not apply a standard implying meaningful access, clarifying that states must "confer
some educational benefit upon the [disabled] child." 1 00 Finally, the Tenth Circuit also notes that
Congress had the ability to increase the standard every time it reauthorized the Act, but instead it
chose to maintain the same statutory definition of a FAPE since its initial conception in the
EHA. 10 1
Circuits in the "some educational benefit" school of thought seem to view the Act as
requiring more benefit than the minimum the Supreme Court required in Rowley. These courts
focus on the language in Rowley, which noted that IEPs represent only a "basic floor of
opportunity" under the IDEA; the Act does not require school districts to provide a level of services
"that would confer additional benefit." 102 To illustrate this school of thought, the Second Circuit
seems to be concerned with "impermissibly meddling in state educational methodology." 103
Another court believes that when it comes to determining if an IEP is reasonably calculated to
proffer a benefit, "courts should not substitute their judgement for that of state and local
educators." 104 Justice Breyer reiterated this statement during oral arguments of Endrew, when he
noted that the Court was being asked to create a definition in an area where it lacked expertise. 105
B. Meaningful Educational Benefit
Courts using the "meaningful educational benefit" standard reason that Rowley was a
narrow decision and nothing in it precludes setting the standard of an educational benefit higher
than "some" or "any."106 Fearing that a difference in the level of education provided could be the
difference in a life of dependency or one of self-sufficiency, 107 the Sixth Circuit held that "the
IDEA requires an IEP to confer a 'meaningful educational benefit' gauged in relation to the
potential of the child at issue." 10 8 But, as the attorney for the respondents pointed out in Endrew,

98

1Id. at 200-01.
99 Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (quoting Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998).
100 J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200).
101 Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1339.
102 Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S.
at 201).
103 Id.
104 J.K. & J.C. v. Missoula Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2016 WL 4082633, at *11 (D. Mont. July 29, 2016).
105 Transcript, supra note 5, at 14.
106 Deal, 392 F.3d at 863.
107 Id.
10s Id. at 862.
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the court only mentioned the term "meaningful" one time to note that the standard in Rowley "can't
be more than meaningful." 10 9
Courts that require an IEP to confer a meaningful educational benefit reason that it could
make all the difference in the independence of the child once they become an adult.1 10 Since the
case before the Rowley Court involved a plaintiff who was receiving passing grades and
progressing successfully to each grade level, the Rowley Court did not have an opportunity to
address how much educational benefit the IEP should confer." Therefore, lower courts have the
opportunity to set a higher standard of educational benefit than "some" or "any."112
Courts in the meaningful benefit camp also look to Congressional intent of the IDEA,
reasoning that applying a "some" educational benefit standard cannot achieve the goals of the
IDEA. 113 Therefore, Congress must have intended the educational benefit to be "meaningful." 114
C. Flip-floppers
Some circuits have remained inconsistent as to which standard to apply. 115 This is due, in
large part, to the language in Rowley mentioned above. 116 For example, the Third Circuit has stated
that the school district must provide an education "sufficient to confer some educational benefit,"
but is not required to "maximize the potential of [disabled] children." 117 Historically, the Third
Circuit required "more than a trivial or de minimis educational benefit." 1 18 But more recently, the
Third Circuit has held that "more than a trivial educational benefit" fails to meet Polk v. Central
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit's standard that an IEP confer a meaningful benefit on the child's
education. 119 The Third Circuit argues that it is now conventional wisdom that the IDEA
"require[s] that a disabled child be placed in the least restrictive environment that will provide him
with a meaningful educational benefit." 120
In Polk, the court observed that one cannot avoid answering the question of "how much
benefit is sufficient to be meaningful" in these types of cases. 12 1 The court examined what the Act
meant by "benefit" and sought to apply a standard that was consistent with Congressional intent
and the Rowley decision. 122 The court noted that Congress defined the EHA's purpose as providing
"full educational opportunity to all [disabled] children." 123 Polk also referenced a Senate Report
Transcript, supra note 5, at 44-45.
See Deal, 392 F. 3d at 863.
" Deal, 392 F. 3d at 863.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 864.
114 Id.
115 Compare Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring a more
than de minimis standard),
and L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ. 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2006) (requiring some educational benefit to maximize
the potential).
116 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
117 Ramsey, 435 F.3d at 390 (quoting T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir.
2000)).
118 Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1213.
119 Ramsey, 435 F.3d at 390 (discussing a standard laid out in Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853
F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988)).
120 Id. at 390 (quoting Kingwood Township, 205 F.3d at
578).
121 Polk, 853 F.2d at 180.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 180-81 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A)).
109

110
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on the amendments from 1975, defining "related services... [as those] necessary for a [disabled]
child to fully benefit from special education." 124 The court in Polk recognized that the Supreme
Court had determined that "Congress did not intend to provide optimal benefit," 125 but the court
countered this by finding that the use of the phrase "full educational opportunity" in the Act itself,
as well as the Act's legislative history, proved an "intent to afford more than a trivial amount of
educational benefit." 126
D. Patently Unclear
Some circuits are so patently unclear as to how much benefit is required under the IDEA
that attorneys have resorted to using the terms "some" and "meaningful" interchangeably. 127 in
Lessard v. Wilton, the First Circuit rejected that an IEP was needed to provide the "maximum
benefit available." 128 The court's reasoning was based on its finding that the standard "had no
support in the text of the amendments . . [or] other court of appeals, post-1997." 129 Then, in 2012,
the court used the term "meaningful" to describe the standard it was applying throughout its
opinion. To dispose of the issue, though, the court cited to a Tenth Circuit case, which concluded
that the IEP need only provide "some" educational benefit, 130 momentarily leaving attorneys
unsure of whether the First Circuit was adopting the Tenth Circuit's "some" educational benefit
standard. Most recently, the First Circuit has stated that it "review[s] an IEP's compliance with the
IDEA based on whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational
benefit."

131

The Fifth Circuit was especially confusing, as it used the term "meaningful" but then
discussed that the benefit does not have to meet a maximum standard. 132 In 1997, the Fifth Circuit
held that a child with disabilities was not entitled to a program that "maximize[d] the child's
educational potential." 133 It quoted Rowley, stating that the "IDEA guarantees a 'basic floor of
opportunity' specifically designed to meet the child's unique needs, supported by services that will
permit him to benefit from the instruction."134 It also held, however, that the educational benefit
"cannot be a mere modicum or de minimis." 135 Instead, the IEP must be "likely to produce
progress."

136

1
Id. at 181 (quoting Sen. R. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 42); see also 121 CONG. REC. 19482 (remarks of
Senator Randolph discussing the goals of the EHA as "[a]chieving a goal of full educational opportunities").
125 Polk, 853 F.2d at 180-81.

id.
See Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 2008); D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B.
v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2012); Ms. S. v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 72, 829 F.3d 95, 114 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting
Esposito, 675 F.3d at 34); see also Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2009).
128 Lessard, 518 F.3d at 28.
126
127

129 Id.
130 Esposito, 675 F.3d at 37 (citing Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149
(10th
Cir. 2008)).
131 MS. S., 829 F.3d at 114 (quoting Esposito, 675 F.3d
at 34).
132 Richardson, 580 F.3d at 292; See Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245,
247 (5th Cir.
1997).
133 See Cypress-Fairbanks,118 F.3d
at 247.
134 Richardson, 580 F.3d at 292 (quoting Cypress-Fairbanks,118 F.3d at 247-48); see also Rowley, 458
U.S. at 20607.
135 Richardson, 580 F.3d at 292 (quoting Cypress-Fairbanks,118 F.3d at 247-48).
136 Id.
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Reconsider our hypothetical of Ella from page three. What would happen if her mother
pursued a cause of action against the school district concerning Ella's IEP? Based on current
precedent, it would entirely depend on which circuit court had jurisdiction over Ella's case. This
is devastating because it means that children with disabilities are receiving different levels of
education across our nation. This also means that teachers and school administrations are left in
limbo, spending their time trying to get a grasp of their circuit's current interpretations, instead of
spending their time doing what they were trained to do: educating our nation's children.
E.

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-i

All of this ambiguity finally made its way to the Supreme Court through Endrew F. v.
Douglas County School. 137 The Tenth Circuit called the difference between "some" and
"meaningful" "fleeting." 138 However, the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the "meaningful
benefit" standard because the standard the court had always applied was the "some benefit"
standard, which the Tenth Circuit believed the Supreme Court adopted in Rowley. 139 Because the
circuits were in complete shambles as to which standard should be applied, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear oral arguments on this case. 140
On January 11, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Endrew. 14 1 The Solicitor
General argued that an IEP should aim for "significant educational progress." 142 He went further
to argue that "significant" and "meaningful" are synonymous, as well as the word "progress." 143
Ultimately, he urged the courts to use the word "appropriate," and to stay away from the term
"meaningful," because it had a lot of baggage in various courts of appeals. 144 The Solicitor General
argued for the standard to be worded as "reasonably calculated to make progress that is appropriate
in light of the child's circumstances." 145 In response to his arguments, Justice Kagan made a joke
about the Solicitor General asking the Court to come up with their own word to be applied by
lower courts in different ways, essentially the exact problem we are facing now. 146
Petitioners argued for an "equal educational opportunity" standard; 147 however, this
standard was previously rejected by the Rowley Court as being an "unworkable standard requiring
impossible measurements and comparisons." 14 8 The Rowley Court went further to explain that the
term "equal" does not appropriately capture the complex phrase, "free appropriate public
See generally Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 29, No. 15-827 (argued Jan. 11, 2017).
Id. at 1340.
139 Id.
137
138

140 Christina Samuels, U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Level of 'Benefit' Special Education Must Provide, EDUC. WEEK

(Sept. 29, 2016), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2016/09/court-special-education-benefit-case.html.
141 See Transcript, supra note
5.
142 Id. at 20; see also Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with Proper Standard for
Measuring
Educational Benefits
for
Children
with
Disabilities, SCOTUS
BLOG
(Jan.
11,
2017),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-justices-grapple-proper-standard-measuring-educationalbenefits-children-disabilities/.
143 Transcript, supra note 5, at 20.
4 Id. at 21.
145 Id. at 24.
146 Id. at 21.
147 Id. at 4; see also Howe, supra note 142 (Petitioner argued for the program to be "reasonably calculated' to
provide
[the child] with educational opportunities that are substantially related equal to those offered to other students").
148 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198.
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education." 149 Petitioners contended that the IDEA's purpose as amended in 1997 and 2004
provides for this "equal educational opportunity standard." 15 0
The Rowley Court's sentiments were reiterated by the Justices. As several Justices pointed
out, the goal of special needs education is about equality of opportunity and not outcomes.
Petitioners' argument for their standard left the Justices confused about how Petitioners thought
this standard helped argue for a higher standard than Rowley suggested. 151 Justice Ginsburg noted
that the Court rejected such a standard in the Rowley decision. 15 2 Justice Breyer pointed out that if
one standard were to be applied for all students, it would not accurately encompass the wide range
of disabilities. 153 He was concerned that this would lead to taking funds intended for providing
services for these children and instead spending them on lawsuits litigating a too rigid standard. 154
Justices Alito, Kagan and Ginsburg specifically seemed to struggle with how the term "equal"
could be applied as the measurement when schools were mandated to create individualized plans
for individual students, with individual needs. 155
Respondents noted that, when there are concerns about interpreting a Congressional
standard, it is for Congress to clarify. 156 They argued that in each IDEA amendment, Congress
continued to focus on procedural protections without touching the substantive standard in the
statute. 157 Respondents argued that, having recognized the ambiguities in the substantive prong,
Congress' 1997 and 2004 amendments to the IDEA placed more emphasis on procedural
protections.158 Throughout their argument, Respondents attempted to illustrate the point that an
IEP is essentially a contract, which is enforceable through procedural mechanisms. 159 Respondents
focused on the "systematic requirements" that are in place through enforcement by the Department
of Education. 160 This was meant to reiterate that Congress believed procedural requirements would
avoid the problems created by ambiguous language. 16 1 Justice Kagan pointed out that this issue
could not rest on the procedural safeguards, stating that "[while] the IDEA has lots of procedures
in it.. .they're all geared towards a particular substantive result." 162
Throughout oral arguments, Justice Breyer continued to discuss his confusion as to what
the Court was supposed to do about all the ambiguous terms. 163 He believed this was really a
question of whether the requirements in the IDEA had been met and whether there was already a
system to enforce these requirements. 164 He also noted that the Justices were hoping to rely on the

149
150

Id. at 199.
Transcript, supra note 5, at 4.

11Id. at 3-4.
152 Id. at 4

Id. at 15.
Id.
155 Transcript, supra note 5, at 18-19.
156 Id. at 40, 52.
157 Id. at 30.
151 Id. at 42-43.
159 Id. at 43-44.
160 Transcript, supra note 5, at 46 (systematic requirements include "cut off funds; redirect funds; and
require annual
reports...").
153

154

161

Id.

162

Id. at 50.
Id. at 15.
Id.

163

1
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Department of Education's expertise in articulating a standard. 165 Instead, the Department left the
issue of interpretation to be decided by the Court. 166 Chief Justice Roberts discussed that
presenting numerous adjectives to the Court when asking the Court to undertake judicial review
does not make it clear to the Court as to what it should adopt. 167 Justice Alito reiterated that the
frustration of this case was the "blizzard of words" that had been thrown at the Court. 168 The Court
continuously focused on facts specific to the Endrew case, possibly eluding to the notion that the
test courts use in IDEA cases should be fact-specific and narrowly tailored. 169 The only thing that
was clear was that the Justices all seemed to be unhappy with the "more than merely de minimis"
standard. 170 If the Court's preference is to case-specific holdings in IDEA cases, then resolving
the circuit split will not fix the problem.
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court released their decision in Endrew. 17 1
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court gave little clarity to the question of what level of educational
benefit a child must receive under his or her IEP to satisfy the requirements of the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act. 172 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that, to meet its
substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must "offer an [individualized education
program] reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child's circumstances."173 The Court simply reaffirmed the holding in Rowley. 174 There was a
slight silver-lining, though, because the Court unanimously rejected the de minimus standard, 175
and instead held that schools need to provide more than a trivial benefit. 176 Parents saw this
decision as expanding the reach of special needs education, while critics say it does little to
change the status quo because the vast majority of schools are already in compliance with the
"more than de minimus" standard. 177 The rejection of the de minimus standard did make a
difference in this specific case. 178 On remand, the district court ruled that the school district has
to pay for the private schooling of special needs children in Colorado. 179 Also, of note, our
Id. at 22.
Transcript, supra note 5, at 22.
167 Id. at 26; see also Howe, supra note 137.
168 Id. at 47 (discussing that significant and meaningful are
synonyms).
169 Id. at 6-7 (Chief Justice Roberts illustrating how one standard doesn't work for every type of disabled
child); see
also id. at 10 (Justice Ginsburg discussing the $70,000 the district has already spent on this one child).
170 Howe, supra note 137; see also Kimberly Robinson, SCOTUS Struggles
with Duty Owed to Disabled Students,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/scotus-struggles-duty-n73014449718/.
171 Endrew F., 798 F.3d at
988.
172 See id.
173 Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court's Decision Rejecting Low Bar for Students with Disabilities, Under
the
Spotlight, SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/endrew-f-v-douglas-countyschool-district/.
174 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
175 Howe, supra note 142.
165

166

176

id.

Laura Mckenna, How Supreme Court Ruling Will Affect Special Education, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/how-a-new-supreme-court-ruling-could-affect-specialeducation/520662/.
178 T. Thomas Metier, The District Court Says a School DistrictMust Pay for the Private Schooling of a Special Needs
Child in
Colorado After
US
Supreme
Court Ruling,
LEGAL ExAM'R
(Feb.
28,
2018),
177

http://fortcollins.legalexaminer.com/miscellaneous/the-district-court-says-a-school-district-must-pay-for-the-private-

schooling-of-a-special-needs-child-in-colorado-after-us-supreme-court-ruling/.
179 Id.
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newest Supreme Court Justice, Neil Gorsuch, while presiding for the Tenth Circuit, ruled1in
2008
80
minimus."'
de
than
'more
be
"merely
to
benefits
educational
required
that the IDEA only

IV.

THE DIFFERENCE IN THE SPLIT IS FLEETING

Justice Sotomayor said it best during oral arguments of Endrew: "I do think the [IDEA]
provides enough to set a clear standard... [but the problem] is trying to come up with the right
words, which will be less confusing to everyone." 18 1 Even the attorney for Respondents offered
nine different standards during oral argument. 182
One may be inclined to turn to the differences in the definition of the two words. "Some"
means "of a fairly large amount or number." 183 "Some" is also defined as "being of an unspecified
amount or number." 184 "Meaningful" is defined as "having real importance or value." 185 It also
means "having a meaning or purpose." 186 Regardless, whether one uses "some" or "meaningful,"
these words are not categorical, and thus not easily measured or defined. This is precisely why the
Tenth Circuit calls the difference between the two standards "fleeting."187
Even within the circuits that have preferred the word "meaningful," there are great
inconsistences.1 8 8 One circuit discusses that the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
for the child to "fully benefit from special education."189 The same circuit court then counters by
noting that the Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress did not mean optimal benefit. 190
Other circuits define "meaningful" as being "sufficient." 191 Yet others define "meaningful" as
providing "some" educational benefits. 192 All in all, the courts have made circular arguments and
have avoided offering any clear examples as to what is required to be considered an educational
benefit. Clearly, this ambiguity cannot be settled by simply referring to our dictionaries.
If we look at the statute itself, in addition to defining FAPE, the Act outlines in great detail
what an IEP entails. 193 The statute states that an essential part of our national policy is to improve

Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F. 3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2008).
Howe, supra note 142.
182 Robinson, supra note
170.
183 Some, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, merriam-webster.com (last visited
Mar. 8, 2017).
184 Id.
185 Meaningful, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, merriam-webster.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2017)
186 Id.
187 Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1340.
18 See Lessard, 518 F.3d at 22; Esposito, 675 F.3d at 34; Ms. S., 829 F.3d at 114 (quoting Esposito, 675 F.3d at 34);
see also Richardson, 580 F.3d at 292.
189 Polk, 853 F.2d at 181.
180

190 Id.

Ramsey, 435 F.3d at 390 (quoting Kingswood Township, 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000)).
See Lessard, 518 F.3d at 22; see Esposito, 675 F.3d at 34; see Ms. S., 829 F.3d at 114 (quoting Esposito, 675 F.3d
at 34).
193 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(19) (2012) ((1) "a statement of the present levels
of educational performance of such child,
(2) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (3) a description of how the child's
progress toward meeting the annual goals described in subclause (II) will be measured (4) a statement of the specific
educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in
regular educational programs, (5) an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with
nondisabled children in the regular class (6) a statement of any individual appropriate accommodations that are
191
192
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educational results for children with disabilities so they have an "equality of opportunity,"
"independent living," and "economic self-sufficiency." 194 The statute further discusses that, while
state and local governments are responsible for providing these educational services, it is the
Federal Government that should have a supporting role in assisting the states in their efforts. 195
While the statute outlines several worthy efforts, it uses ambiguous words to define what
standards are necessary to comply with the Act. Yet, the Act does make one thing clear: while
state and local governments are vested with providing services to children with disabilities, the
Federal Government should have an active and continuous role in the education of children with
disabilities. Congress recognizes that it has a valuable role to play in the education of all children
in this nation, including those with disabilities. However, the Act does not set parameters for the
achievement of the goals laid out within the Act. It is the classic "throw money at the problem,"
but do not actually ensure the problem is fixed. Instead, Congress, in what is most likely an effort
to appease stakeholders with differing views, has emphasized the procedural safeguards in the Act
and left any ambiguity to be duked out in court proceedings. The problem here is that courts exist
to make sure someone's rights have not been violated, and to provide recourse when they are. The
purpose of the court system is not to rewrite legislation when Congress is unclear.
In addition, Congress has had years to clarify these ambiguities, and every time it has
amended the IDEA, it chose to keep the ambiguities as they are. This leads one to wonder if
Congress never intended there to be a substantive portion to this legislation, and instead only that
the legislation be enforced and measured upon procedural requirements. Maybe what the courts
are supposed to do is decide cases on procedural grounds only.
The biggest problem with this is best illustrated by recalling our hypothetical student, Ella.
Ella's teacher is making accommodations according to Ella's IEP, but Ella is still unable to keep
up with the rest of her class. One would assume that the school should go back and modify the
accommodations, but that would require costly testing and pages of paperwork. Additionally, since
IEPs are only issued on an annual basis, it could take until the next academic year for Ella's new
accommodations to be approved.
In the meantime, what is her mother to do? Initiate a lawsuit? Let's assume she does. If the
court only looks to the procedural requirements of the Act, the school has met them. It has
developed an IEP for the current school year, it is following that IEP, and it has included Ella's
mother in that process. Aside from violating the process of creating the IEP (let us assume here
that there was none), the school has not violated any procedural requirement. Therefore, the school
has not violated the Act, and the court should rule in favor of the school. If this were the outcome,
Ella would continue failing her classes. This begs the question that maybe what Congress needs to
do is make the process more efficient. Yet, any lawyer will tell you not to hold your breath waiting
for Congress and the Administration to "act." 196
necessary to measure the academic achievement and functional performance of the child on State and districtwide
assessments (7) and the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services").
194 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
195 Id.

See Condit, supra note 8, at 19 ("Many argue that in today's political climate, Congress will not likely be able to
pass legislation that expressly heightens schools' responsibilities to special education students"); see also Terry Jean
Selignann, Sliding Doors: The Rowley Decision, Interpretation of Special Education Law, and What Might Have
Been, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 93-94 (Jan. 2012) ("Despite the sympathetic proposition that children with disabilities
should receive an appropriate education, given the current landscape one wonders whether it would be possible to
pass an entitlement statute like the IDEA today").
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To add more confusion and frustration to the lives of families with children with
disabilities, 197 the new Secretary of Education was unaware that special education services are
mandated by federal law. 198 During Secretary DeVos' confirmation hearing before the Senate
HELP1 99 Committee, it became clear that DeVos was unaware that the IDEA was a federal law
that she would be obligated to enforce if confirmed.20 0 When questioned by Senator Hassan about
enforcing the requirements of the IDEA, DeVos said that, "states should have the right to decide
whether to enforce IDEA."2 0 1 Senator Hassan went on to proclaim that the IDEA was a "federal
civil rights law." 202 DeVos tried to assure the Senator that she would "be very sensitive to the
needs of special needs students and the policies surrounding that," 203 to which Hassan replied, "it's
not about sensitivity, although that helps,... [it's about] enforcing the federal law to ensure that all
children have access to public education." 204 This may signal that Congress still feels the issue is
about access to education rather than providing a benefit, or it could just be the opinion of one
Senator. Either way, for Americans to know how much of an educational benefit is required under
the IDEA, Congress will have to address the issue.

V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There is great public backlash against using public school resources to provide expensive
treatments to children with disabilities. 205 In the long run though, the expense to society of
providing lifetime care to adults with disabilities who do not receive early intervention and
education is far greater. 206 While I strongly believe this is a problem for legislatures to fix, in the
interim, the courts can use standards similar to the ones they apply in the Americans with
Disabilities Act accommodation cases. Additionally, the Secretary of Education made it clear that
she has a lot of catching up to do before she understands how to enforce the IDEA. That leaves us
197
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(Jan.
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2017),
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see also Kimberlee
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McCafferty,
A
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Part Two,
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(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://autismmommytherapist.wordpress.com/2017/01/23/a-call-to-action-part-two/.
198 See Douglas N. Harris, Betsy DeVos and the Wrong Way to Fix Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/opinion/betsy-devos-and-the-wrong-way-to-fix-schools.html; see also Charles
P. Pierce, The Betsy DeVos Hearing was an Insult to Democracy, ESQUIRE (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a52357/betsy-devos-hearing; see also Aimee Ortiz, Hassan
Questions Betsy DeVos's Knowledge of Civil Rights DisabilitiesLaw for Students, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2017/01/18/devos-unfamiliarity-with-civil-rights-law-for-students-withdisabilities-concerns-hassan/eaRGmlbAzUy9PG2RCl5Q8M/story.html.
199 HELP is a commonly used shorthand for the Health, Education, Labor and Pension. See U.S. Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, SENATE.GOV, https://www.help.senate.gov, (last visited March 11, 2018).
200
See Valerie Strauss, SixAstonishing Things Betsy DeVos Said-andRefused to Say-At Her ConfirmationHearing,
WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/18/six-astonishingthings-betsy-devos-said-and-refused-to-say-at-her-confirmation-hearing; see also Emmarie Huetteman & Yamiche
Alcindor, Betsy DeVos Confirmed as Education Secretary; Pence Breaks Tie, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-secretary-confirmed.html (noting that Betty
DeVos was confirmed by a vote of 51-50 on Feb. 7, 2017).
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with the branch of government that created this problem-Congress. After discussing remedies
for the courts to apply, this section will describe how Congress can fix the ambiguities in the
language of the Act to ensure clearer interpretation and implementation under the IDEA. Lastly,
parental resources will be discussed to emphasize that no solution is successful without the
involvement of the parents of the child with disabilities.
A. Comparison to How Courts Handle Americans with Disabilities Act Claims
One possible solution for courts to use as they wait on Congress is to apply the standards
used in workplace accommodations to cases involving the IDEA. Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits the states and other employers from "discriminating
against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability . .. in regard to . . . terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." 207 Employers violate the statute when they do not
make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity." 20 8 Through litigation, what qualifies as a "reasonable accommodation" has been somewhat
defined.
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,for example, the Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the states "to make special accommodations for
the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational." 209 Likewise, in
Tennessee v. Lane, a case involving two people in wheelchairs who needed access to a courthouse
with no wheelchair ramp, the Court held that Title II of the ADA prevented discrimination against
a disabled person by public entities. 210 This holding required the government to ensure that an
individual be able to participate in or take part in the benefits of any service, program or activity
conducted by a public body without discrimination because of their disability. 2 11
Applying these standards to the accommodations under the IDEA, a school is a public
entity and would thus be prohibited from discriminating against a disabled student. The school
would need to ensure that the disabled student be able to participate in or take part in the benefits
of any service, program or activity conducted by the school without discrimination because of their
disability. However, it would not be required to make special accommodations so long as the
school's actions toward the individual were rational. More accurately, the school is not required
to make accommodations that would place an undue hardship on the other students' ability to
receive a free appropriate education.
A judge could then apply a balancing test to the substantive prong of Rowley. Instead of
trying to deal with the ambiguity of the terms "some" and "meaningful" in defining whether an
educational benefit was provided, the focus would be on reasonableness-a standard the courts
are much more familiar with. Reasonableness appeals to both our heart and our head. Instead of
the IEP needing to provide a child with a benefit, the question could be, "has the school made
reasonable accommodations to provide the child with a FAPE under the IDEA?" What is
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(a)-(b)(5)(A).
209 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).
210 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004).
211 Id. at 529.
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reasonable could be decided on a case by case basis, determined by specific facts and needs of the
individual child, and balanced with the resources of the school district. This balancing test would
also be in line with Rowley, where the Court noted that, if there were insufficient funds to provide
for the desirable programs needed by the child with disabilities, then the funds that are available
should be apportioned so that no child is entirely excluded from a public education. 212
Public education is a public benefit to which everyone should have equal access. Special
education is not about equal outcomes, but rather about making accommodations that are
reasonable, so the child has the ability to learn alongside his or her peers. However, "an ineffective
'modification' or 'adjustment' will not accommodate a disabled individual's limitations." 2 13 For
students with disabilities, that means providing accommodations to give the child an opportunity
to learn alongside his or her peers.
If IDEA is about access to education and not about results, then why not have Ella's mom
file a discrimination claim against the school? The Supreme Court answered this question in a
recent case, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools. 2 14 While the IDEA makes clear that it does not
prohibit the rights and remedies afforded under other federal laws, it limits relief under those other
laws for lawsuits where relief can be granted under the IDEA.2 15 The Supreme Court held in Fry
that if the essence of the plaintiffs suit is the denial of the IDEA's core guarantees of a FAPE,
then a parent must exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures under the Act. 2 16 Exhaustion of
the IDEA's procedures is necessary when the plaintiff seeks relief that is available under the
IDEA.2 17 Courts are to look at the substance of the claims to set aside any attempt at artful
pleading. 2 18

Additionally, the education of children with disabilities is also about post-secondary skills.
One of the overall goals of the IDEA and its predecessors is to keep children with disabilities in
the regular classroom as much as possible. While for some children with disabilities selfsufficiency in their adult life is out of reach, that does not mean that the school and parents should
not aim to teach the student skills that the child can use in their adult life. Sometimes, this is simply
the skill of interacting and getting along with peers. This is why being integrated into the classroom
as much as possible, without impairing the other students from the education owed to them, is
crucial in any analysis and implementation of IEPs.
To ensure that the term "reasonable" does not create more ambiguity, "reasonable" should
be judged by looking at what the school district can financially afford to provide, as well as using
grant funding to cover disparities. Once fiscal limitations were reached, further accommodations
would not be available. The legislature should put a clause into the IDEA barring the taking of
dollars spent per child without IEPs and reallocating them to children with IEPs. Instead, each
state should use a formula to set forth how much money each school would have to make these
accommodations (taking into account how many children with IEPs there were in the previous
year in each district). Once that amount is reached, the school should apply for a supplemental
budget and grants to cover additional costs. Once the school has shown that it has made all efforts
and exhausted their resources, no further accommodations could be made for that year. This
method makes it easier to hold schools accountable. In order to prevent a school from having to
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199 (citing Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.C. 1972)).
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
214 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749
(2017).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 754-55.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 755.
212
213
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make further accommodations, it must show all of the steps it has gone through before being
relieved of its duty. This also ensures more predictability in IDEA lawsuits for both the parents
and the school district. Instead of ambiguous, non-categorical words used to measure academic
achievement, the reasonableness standard is based on balancing what has already been done with
what resources are still available. This emphasis on resources will also thrust constituents to put
pressure on Congress to actually fund schools to a level that allows them to provide an appropriate
education to all students. After all, a well-educated society is always a better society.
B. Role of the Federal Government
As discussed above, courts have noted over the years that Congress has repeatedly left the
level of educational benefit required ambiguous. 2 19 It is the role of Congress to clearly define a
statute so that the appropriate executive branch may enforce it. 220 Yet, time and time again, it has
failed to do so with the IDEA, 22 1 putting the courts in a quasi-legislative role and left to guess what
Congress intended.2 2 2 The Court in Rowley actually cautioned that courts "lack the specialized
knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy." 223 During oral argument for Endrew, Justice Breyer further reiterated the cautionary
advice given by the Court in Rowley when he discussed the lack of expertise the justices had
regarding education policy. 224 Therefore, because the courts lack the expertise to devise a new
legal standard on the education of individuals with disabilities, this problem should be fixed by
Congress.
When it comes to the education of our children, problems often arise due to a lack of
resources, not ambiguities in interpretation. Even if Congress were to solve the ambiguities in the
language it uses in the IDEA, courts would still not be able to provide an actual remedy if the
school district lacked the resources needed to make an accommodation. As discussed above, the
Federal Government has a major role to play in helping state and local governments implement
regulations concerning the education of our nation's children.
Besides fixing the ambiguities discussed above, the Federal Government can help by
creating grants that allow state and local governments the flexibility in funding that is needed from
year to year. These grants could be used to fill shortfalls in local and state education budgets on a
yearly basis. Making the grants renewable on a yearly basis allows the Federal Government to
move its resources quickly to accommodate yearly changes in the number of students with
disabilities in specific locations. It should be noted that grant funding does exist for special needs
education. However, the reauthorization of ESSA did not make changes to the flexibility of how
grants for special education were allocated like it did for grants that go to schools which serve low
income students; schools near Native American reservations or near military bases; and schools

See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176; See also Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1339.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1, art. 2, § 2.
221 Kowal, supra note 66, at
825.
222 See id. at 839.
223 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.
224 Transcript, supra note 5, at 14 (Bryer, J. stating, "besides having nine people who don't know . .
that much about
it, creating a new standard out of legal materials which are at a distance from the people, the children and the parents
who need help.").
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that serve higher populations of English learners. 225 In addition, the IDEA has never been fully
funded. 226 It is impossible for Congress to expect children with disabilities to receive the
educational benefits they are entitled to if Congress does not choose to fully fund that entitlement.
Congress recently reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act through the
Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015.227 In doing so, it restructured how grant funding was
calculated, and it also restructured grant programs for schools. 228 An additional resource of federal
money to local schools can be found in Title I, Title III, Title V, Title VI, Title VII, and Title IX
funding. 229 This funding is used for schools in areas that serve an overwhelming majority of
children below the poverty line; children from reservations; public schools located close to military
bases; schools serving homeless populations; and schools that need resources for English
learners. 230 The Federal Government provides this additional grant funding to schools because it
has recognized these categories as having additional resource needs, such as food over the
weekend, snacks after school, after school care programs, and higher demands for counseling and
health services. 231
Using these grant structures as an outline, Congress should create an additional category
of federal funding eligibility for schools who serve a particular percentage of children with
disabilities. While IDEA sub-b grants already provide funding for States to implement special
education services, this program has never been fully funded. Instead, Congress should include
funding mechanisms for states to serve students with disabilities in the ESSA, the legislation that
encompasses all of their other school grants. Including grants for special education in the nation's
overarching legislation that governs how federal money goes to public schools will further promote
our societal values of educating all children.
In contrast, is the real problem that courts have refused to listen to the blueprint Congress
gave them regarding how much educational benefit was required under the IDEA? The IDEA
states that:
[a]lmost 30 years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education
of children with disabilities can be made more effective by-(A) having high
expectations for such children and ensuring their access to the general education
curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent possible, in order to(i) meet developmental goals and, to the maximum extent possible, the challenging
expectations that have been established for all children... 232
Based on these Congressional findings, it sounds like the IEPs need to be tailored so that they set
the highest possible standards for the child and meet developmental goals.
See Klein, supra note 59 (ESSA made changes to testing requirements for children with disabilities, but there is no
mention of grant funding); see also Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), 114 Pub. L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
226 Kowal, supra note 66, at 837 (arguing that while Congress has increased the number of categories of
disabilities
under the IDEA, they have not increased its funding).
227 Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), 114 Pub. L. No. 95, 129 Stat.
1802 (2015).
228 This is the author's own knowledge from working with various stakeholders in Congress prior
to the ESSA's
enactment.
229 ESSA, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat.
1802.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c)(5) (2012), amended by Every Student
Succeeds
Act, 114 Pub. L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
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The courts could use this language to say that the level of benefit an IEP must provide the
student is one in which the student actually meets developmental goals. This is problematic
though, because as we saw with NCLB, schools respond by setting abysmally low standards for
children, to ensure that their numbers show progress. If the standard is whether the child has met
developmental goals each year, schools would be incentivized to set low goals for children with
disabilities. Even though Congressional findings suggest that having high expectations leads to
better results, if the school does not have enough available resources to help the child reach
maximum goals, requiring them to do so only takes what little funding they have for special
education and redirects it to paying for lawsuits when maximum goals are not achieved.
As discussed earlier in this section, however, the problem is less about ambiguous wording
than it is about a lack of resources. Until we as a nation decide that the investment in special
education from an early age provides society with a greater benefit than choosing to not educate
children with disabilities, Congress will never provide the money necessary to avoid IDEA
lawsuits. As a society, we can choose to pay for complete dependence on the public coffers once
the child becomes an adult, or we can choose to fund education for children with disabilities
now-knowing that proven early intervention techniques lead to more independent adults.
Ultimately, the way to solve this problem is through Congress fully funding the program it
created.
C. Parental Resources
One thing that Congress cannot legislate is the need for parental involvement in their
child's education. As one mother put it, "I am overwhelmed." 2 33 For parents with a child with
disabilities, one of their biggest hurdles to overcome is the paperwork.2 34 To even get to the process
of creating an IEP with the school district can take months. The process involves both independent
and school evaluations, requires countless documents, and must be met with active parent
involvement. 235 It also involves an emotional toll that comes with adjusting your lifestyle around
accommodations for your child. While most parents would do anything for their kids, this can be
a stressful time. Further, as the child grows, there is need for constant adjustment. In addition to
the accommodations in a family's lifestyle, there are also financial needs that develop.
To help alleviate some of the stress and possibly mitigate future disagreements down the
line, local school districts could offer educational programs to help with the miles of paperwork
that a family with a child with disabilities is faced with completing each year. Similar to the "Back
to School" and "How to Help Your Child Apply for College" informational nights, these evenings
or weekend seminars would provide parents with (1) face-to-face time with their child's educators;
(2) provide the ability to create a support group with parents similarly situated; and (3) start the
channels of communication with the school district on a positive note. At a minimum, schools
could provide a list of online resources for parents, as well as a list of resources, available in the
local community, i.e. therapists, aftercare providers specializing in children with disabilities, and
pertinent contact information for local and state departments.
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Additionally, the sessions should be taught by the teachers who work in the special
education field. A school could also have experts from the community come in and discuss the
resource area they work in. Although there are always concerns regarding the cost of having an
expert speak, as well as liability for what is said, most professions have people that deeply care
about the work they do and are willing to volunteer on occasion to help provide education in the
community. Furthermore, grants could be obtained to fund the cost of having expert speakers, and
local support groups are also great at raising money for causes. Per the liability concerns, this can
be taken care of with a simple waiver discussing that these informational events are meant to
simply expose the parents to all the resources available to them and are not meant as legal or
medical advice, etc. By creating a solution that lessens the probability of litigation, the dollars that
are spent on costly lawsuits could be put toward resources that ultimately help the child.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The education of our nation's children, including children with disabilities, is the
responsibility of every citizen. While most stakeholders blame the courts for not providing clear
guidelines to determine an educational benefit, it has historically been the legislature that has acted
and changed the status quo regarding education for Americans with disabilities. As discussed
previously, the Supreme Court's decision in Endrew did not solve the problem for several reasons.
First, special education is all about individualized standards for individual needs; therefore,
applying one standard to all IDEA cases is contrary to the goals of special education. Second,
choosing a non-categorical word as a measurement of a benefit opens the door to even more
litigation to try and define the parameters of the chosen word. Lastly, a court ruling that an IEP
does not provide the correct level of benefit to a child with disabilities does little in the way of a
remedy for the claimant if the school does not have the resources to provide more. The only
possible solution the courts could provide is to do away with the substantive prong of Rowley and
replace it with a balancing test, applying reasonableness. The confusion over how much
educational benefit Congress sought to provide under the IDEA was created by Congress when it
chose to place additional requirements on states without increasing the funding provided to the
states to fulfill these requirements. It is the legislature that has the power of the purse. It is the
legislature that can provide more or less money to an initiative. Thus, resources should be put
toward lobbying Congress to provide more funding so that appropriate and effective
accommodations can be made.
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